Related papers: A game-theoretic mechanism for aggregation and dis…

In this work first we consider a physiologically structured population model with a distributed recruitment process. That is, our model allows newly recruited individuals to enter the population at all possible individual states, in…

We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are…

For two classes of Mean Field Game systems we study the convergence of solutions as the interest rate in the cost functional becomes very large, modeling agents caring only about a very short time-horizon, and the cost of the control…

We consider a fitness-structured population model with competition and migration between nearest neighbors. Under a combination of large population and rare migration limits we are particularly interested in the asymptotic behavior of the…

Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…

We consider the problem of understanding the coordinated movements of biological or artificial swarms. In this regard, we propose a learning scheme to estimate the coordination laws of the interacting agents from observations of the swarm's…

We consider a fitness-driven model of dispersal of $N$ interacting populations, which was previously studied merely in the case $N=1$. Based on some optimal transport distance recently introduced, we identify the model as a gradient flow in…

Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…

We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…

We introduce a mean-field framework for the study of systems of interacting particles sharing a conserved quantity. The work generalises and unites the existing fields of asset-exchange models, often applied to socio-economic systems, and…

Nonlocal aggregation-diffusion models, when coupled with a spatial map, can capture cognitive and memory-based influences on animal movement and population-level patterns. In this work, we study a one-dimensional…

Resource are often not uniformly distributed within a population. Spatial variations of concentration of a resource, change the fitness of competing strategies locally. The notion of fitness varying with respect to both genotype and…

The interdependence between an individual strategy decision and the resulting change of environmental state is often a subtle process. Feedback-evolving games have been a prevalent framework for studying such feedback in well-mixed…

Complex networks serve as abstract models for understanding real-world complex systems and provide frameworks for studying structured dynamical systems. This article addresses limitations in current studies on the exploration of individual…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

The accumulation of individual fitness or wealth is modelled as a population game in which pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a…

We analyze the dynamics of evolutionary games in which fitness is defined as an affine function of the expected payoff and a constant contribution. The resulting inhomogeneous replicator equation has an homogeneous equivalent with modified…