Related papers: Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many…
We divide efficiently a pile of indivisible goods in common property, using cash transfers to ensure fairness among agents with utility linear in money. We compare three cognitively feasible and privacy preserving division rules in terms of…
It is known that any open necklace with beads of $t$ types in which the number of beads of each type is divisible by $k$, can be partitioned by at most $(k-1)t$ cuts into intervals that can be distributed into $k$ collections, each…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset $\mathcal{M}$ of $t$ types of indivisible items among $d$ groups of agents, where all agents within a group have identical additive valuations. Gorantla et al. [GMV23] showed…
A pizza is a pair of planar convex bodies $A\subseteq B$,where $B$ represents the dough and $A$ the topping of the pizza. A partition of a pizza by straight lines is a succession of double operations:a cut by a full straight line, followed…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
The well-known "necklace splitting theorem" of Alon asserts that every $k$-colored necklace can be fairly split into $q$ parts using at most $t$ cuts, provided $k(q-1)\leq t$. In a joint paper with Alon et al. we studied a kind of opposite…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…
The minimum number of elements needed for a poset to have exactly n linear extensions is at most 2sqrt{n}. In a special case, the bound can be improved to sqrt{n}.
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
In this article we study the problem of fair division. In particular we study a notion introduced by J. Barbanel that generalizes super envy-free fair division. We give a new proof of his result. Our approach allows us to give an explicit…
The set of relevant cuts in a graph is the union of all minimum weight bases of the cut space. A cut is relevant if and only if it is the a minimum weight cut between two distinct vertices. Moreover, we give a characterization in terms of…
In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…
The existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, even for additive valuations. The current state of the art is that no setting where EFX allocations are impossible is known, and EFX is known to exist for ($i$)…
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
The question of what global information must distributed rational agents a-priori know about the network in order for equilibrium to be possible is researched here. Until now, distributed algorithms with rational agents have assumed that…
Let $f(n,k)$ be the minimum number of edges that must be removed from some complete geometric graph $G$ on $n$ points, so that there exists a tree on $k$ vertices that is no longer a planar subgraph of $G$. In this paper we show that…
We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…
We study the consensus-halving problem of dividing an object into two portions, such that each of $n$ agents has equal valuation for the two portions. The $\epsilon$-approximate consensus-halving problem allows each agent to have an…
We study the chore division problem where a set of agents needs to divide a set of chores (bads) among themselves fairly and efficiently. We assume that agents have linear disutility (cost) functions. Like for the case of goods, competitive…