Related papers: The power of the largest player
Weighted voting games are a popular class of coalitional games that are widely used to model real-life situations of decision-making. They can be applied, for instance, to analyze legislative processes in parliaments or voting in corporate…
We introduce two models of multiwinner elections with approval preferences and labelled candidates that take the committee's diversity into account. One model aims to find a committee with maximal diversity given a scoring function (e.g. of…
Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so (Galileo Galilei). According to the above sentence we do not ask why we need to measure democracy but if it is possible to measure something which is not unequivocally defined.…
Domineering is a combinatorial game played on a subset of a rectangular grid between two players. Each board position can be put into one of four outcome classes based on who the winner will be if both players play optimally. In this note,…
More than one billion data sampled with different frequencies from several financial instruments were investigated with the aim of testing whether they involve power law. As a result, a known power law with the power exponent around -4 was…
I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes…
One unexamined assumption in foreign ownership regulation is the notion that majority voting rights translate to 'effective control'. This assumption is so deeply entrenched in foreign investments law that possession of majority voting…
We build a game-theoretic model to formalize Kindleberger's (1996) idea of the public good of leadership. Two superpowers use ideology to compete for influence by forming clubs whose members benefit more when their orientations are closer…
When are all positions of a game numbers? We show that two properties are necessary and sufficient. These properties are consequences of that, in a number, it is not an advantage to be the first player. One of these properties implies the…
Weighted voting games are a well-known and useful class of succinctly representable simple games that have many real-world applications, e.g., to model collective decision-making in legislative bodies or shareholder voting. Among the…
In this paper, we propose an improved version of the power index related to the Banzhaf power index for weighted voting systems. This index now takes into account the mutual persuasion power matrix(PPM) existing among the voters. This…
Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…
We study the mathematical properties of probabilistic processes in which the independent actions of $n$ players (`causes') can influence the outcome of each player (`effects'). In such a setting, each pair of outcomes will generally be…
We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members'…
We study a random game in which two players in turn play a fixed number of moves. For each move, there are two possible choices. To each possible outcome of the game we assign a winner in an i.i.d. fashion with a fixed parameter p. In the…
There are many factors that can influence the outcome of an election. We here identify two dominant effects that can affect the votes obtained by a candidate, namely, the Majority Effect and the Media Effect. We mimic these two effects in a…
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
Systems of indirect voting based on the principle of qualified majority can be analysed using the methods of game theory. In particular, this applies to the voting system in the Council of the European Union, which was recently a subject of…
The dynamics of many socioeconomic systems is determined by the decision making process of agents. The decision process depends on agent's characteristics, such as preferences, risk aversion, behavioral biases, etc.. In addition, in some…