Related papers: The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamic…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…
In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game…
Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…
Human social life is shaped by repeated interactions, where past experiences guide future behavior. In evolutionary game theory, a key challenge is to identify strategies that harness such memory to succeed in repeated encounters. Decades…
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
This paper presents the design of a cooperative multi-player betting game, Trust-ya, as a model of some elements of status processes in human groups. The game is designed to elicit status-driven leader-follower behaviours as a means to…
Cooperative behaviors are common in humans and are fundamental to our society. Theoretical and experimental studies have modeled environments in which the behaviors of humans, or agents, have been restricted to analyze their social…
Trust between team members is an essential requirement for any successful cooperation. Thus, engendering and maintaining the fellow team members' trust becomes a central responsibility for any member trying to not only successfully…
Feedback loops between population dynamics of individuals and their ecological environment are ubiquitously found in nature, and have shown profound effects on the resulting eco-evolutionary dynamics. Incorporating linear environmental…
We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate…
AI safety is an increasingly urgent concern as the capabilities and adoption of AI systems grow. Existing evolutionary models of AI governance have primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation, typically…
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…
Experimental studies have shown the ubiquity of altruistic behavior in human societies. The social structure is a fundamental ingredient to understand the degree of altruism displayed by the members of a society, in contrast to…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
We revisit two evolutionary game theory models, namely the Prisoner and the Snowdrift dilemmas, on top of small-world networks. These dynamics on networked populations (individuals occupying nodes of a graph) are mainly concerning on the…
An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the…
I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…
In game theory, the notion of a player's beliefs about the game players' beliefs about other players' beliefs arises naturally. In this paper, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which shows that completely…