Related papers: Toll Caps in Privatized Road Networks
When people pick routes to minimize their travel time, the total experienced delay, or social cost, may be significantly greater than if people followed routes assigned to them by a social planner. This effect is accentuated when human…
When selfish users share a road network and minimize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games,…
Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games are in general inefficient as they do not induce an optimal flow that minimizes the total travel time. Network tolls are a prominent and popular way to induce an optimum flow in equilibrium.…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is composed of many individual agents, it is known that…
In a traffic network, vehicles normally select their routes selfishly. Consequently, traffic networks normally operate at an equilibrium characterized by Wardrop conditions. However, it is well known that equilibria are inefficient in…
Traditionally, Internet Access Providers (APs) only charge end-users for Internet access services; however, to recoup infrastructure costs and increase revenues, some APs have recently adopted two-sided pricing schemes under which both…
Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion by increasing road capacity via vehicle platooning and by creating an avenue for influencing people's…
We analyze analytically the effect of congestion costs within a physically relevant, yet exactly solvable network model featuring central hubs. These costs lead to a competition between centralized and decentralized transport pathways. In…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Congestion pricing policies have emerged as promising traffic management tools to alleviate traffic congestion caused by travelers' selfish routing behaviors. The core principle behind deploying tolls is to impose monetary costs on…
How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…
Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion, both by increasing network throughput and by enabling a social planner to incentivize users of…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
We study routing behavior in transportation networks with mixed autonomy, that is, networks in which a fraction of the vehicles on each road are equipped with autonomous capabilities such as adaptive cruise control that enable reduced…
We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as…
With autonomous vehicles now sharing roads with human drivers, the era of mixed autonomy brings new challenges in dealing with congestion. One cause of congestion is when vehicle users choose their routes selfishly to minimize their…
This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy…
In this paper, we reveal the relationship between entropy rate and the congestion in complex network and solve it analytically for special cases. Finding maximizing entropy rate will lead to an improvement of traffic efficiency, we propose…
Tolling, or congestion pricing, has emerged as an effective tool for preventing gridlock in traffic systems. However, tolls are currently mostly designed on route-based traffic assignment models (TAM), which may be unrealistic and…