Related papers: Efficient Black-Box Reductions for Separable Cost …

The use of orthogonal signaling schemes such as time-, frequency-, or code-division multiplexing (T-, F-, CDM) in multi-user systems allows for power-efficient simple receivers. It is shown in this paper that by using orthogonal signaling…

A common assumption in the existing network coding literature is that the users are cooperative and non-selfish. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. In this paper, we analyze inter-session network coding in a wired network…

We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…

We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior…

We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource…

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…

This paper considers the distributed strategy design for Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in multi-cluster games under a partial-decision information scenario. In the considered game, there are multiple clusters and each cluster consists of a…

In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network systems, content (object) delivery between nodes is often required. One way to study such a distributed system is by defining games, which involve selfish nodes that make strategic choices on replicating…

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…

This paper introduces a novel class of multi-stage resource allocation games that model real-world scenarios in which profitability depends on the balance between supply and demand, and where higher resource investment leads to greater…

Flow scheduling tends to be one of the oldest and most stubborn problems in networking. It becomes more crucial in the next generation network, due to fast changing link states and tremendous cost to explore the global structure. In such…

Current fault-tolerant quantum compilers allocate error budgets uniformly during resource estimation, causing suboptimal physical resource overhead. We optimize this allocation using a potential game formulation, where Nash Equilibrium…

This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…

In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…

As wireless communication becomes an ever-more evolving and pervasive part of the existing world, system capacity and Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning are becoming more critically evident. In order to improve system capacity and QoS,…

We study the problem of sensor scheduling for an intrusion detection task. We model this as a two-player zero-sum game over a graph, where the defender (Player 1) seeks to identify the optimal strategy for scheduling sensor orientations to…

The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…

We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is…