Related papers: A Cut-And-Choose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymanderi…
The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich…
In modern data center networks, thousands of hosts contend for shared link capacity; the scale of these systems makes centralized scheduling impractical. This article models such scheduling as a bipartite matching problem under…
In representative democracies, the election of new representatives in regular election cycles is meant to prevent corruption and other misbehavior by elected officials and to keep them accountable in service of the ``will of the people."…
Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic \emph{selection mechanism} is a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is \emph{incentive-compatible} (IC), if the probability assigned to a vertex does not change…
The single transferable vote (STV) is a system of preferential proportional voting employed in multi-seat elections. Each ballot cast by a voter is a (potentially partial) ranking over a set of candidates. The margin of victory, or simply…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…
We propose a new method, probabilistic divide-and-conquer, for improving the success probability in rejection sampling. For the example of integer partitions, there is an ideal recursive scheme which improves the rejection cost from…
As machine learning has become more prevalent, researchers have begun to recognize the necessity of ensuring machine learning systems are fair. Recently, there has been an interest in defining a notion of fairness that mitigates…
The Political Districting Problem is mapped to a $q$-state Potts model in which the constraints can be written as interactions between sites or external fields acting on the system. Districting into $q$ voter districts is equivalent to…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
Given a rectangle $R$ with area $A$ and a set of areas $L=\{A_1,...,A_n\}$ with $\sum_{i=1}^n A_i = A$, we consider the problem of partitioning $R$ into $n$ sub-regions $R_1,...,R_n$ with areas $A_1,...,A_n$ in a way that the total…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
The basic idea of voting protocols is that nodes query a sample of other nodes and adjust their own opinion throughout several rounds based on the proportion of the sampled opinions. In the classic model, it is assumed that all nodes have…
An alternative voting scheme is proposed to fill the democratic gap between a president elected democratically via universal suffrage (deterministic outcome, the actual majority decides), and a president elected by one person randomly…
Elections for public offices in democratic nations are large-scale examples of collective decision-making. As a complex system with a multitude of interactions among agents, we can anticipate that universal macroscopic patterns could emerge…
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size…
We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…
How to elect the representatives in legislative bodies is a question that every modern democracy has to answer. This design task has to consider various elements so as to fulfill the citizens' expectations and contribute to the maintenance…
When eliciting forecasts from a group of experts, it is important to reward predictions so that market participants are incentivized to tell the truth. Existing mechanisms partially accomplish this but remain susceptible to groups of…
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that…