Related papers: Measuring Information Burden: From Coalition-Based…
Today, the vast majority of the world's digital information is represented using the fundamental assumption, introduced by Claude Shannon in 1948, that ``...the semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem (of…
We address the fundamental problem of selection under uncertainty by modeling it from the perspective of Bayesian persuasion. In our model, a decision maker with imperfect information always selects the option with the highest expected…
We characterize information as risk reduction between knowledge states represented by partitions of the underlying probability space. Entropy corresponds to risk reduction from no (or partial) knowledge to full knowledge about a random…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
A celebrated 1976 theorem of Aumann asserts that honest, rational Bayesian agents with common priors will never "agree to disagree": if their opinions about any topic are common knowledge, then those opinions must be equal. Economists have…
An important question in the field of AI is the extent to which successful behaviour requires an internal representation of the world. In this work, we quantify the amount of information an optimal policy provides about the underlying…
The Pandora's box problem (Weitzman 1979) is a core model in economic theory that captures an agent's (Pandora's) search for the best alternative (box). We study an important generalization of the problem where the agent can either fully…
Mobile edge computing (MEC) has empowered mobile devices (MDs) in supporting artificial intelligence (AI) applications through collaborative efforts with proximal MEC servers. Unfortunately, despite the great promise of device-edge…
Inspired by e-participation systems, in this paper we propose a new model to represent human debates and methods to obtain collective conclusions from them. This model overcomes drawbacks of existing approaches by allowing users to…
We consider the average-consensus problem in a multi-node network of finite size. Communication between nodes is modeled by a sequence of directed signals with arbitrary communication delays. Four distributed algorithms that achieve…
The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale, high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to many paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing data, motivating the study of economic processes with data…
As intelligent systems are developed across diverse substrates - from machine learning models and neuromorphic hardware to in vitro neural cultures - understanding what gives a system agency has become increasingly important. Existing…
We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…
Every day, we judge the probability of propositions. When we communicate graded confidence (e.g. "I am 90% sure"), we enable others to gauge how much weight to attach to our judgment. Ideally, people should share their judgments to reach…
A dominant paradigm in visual intelligence treats semantics as a static property of latent representations, assuming that meaning can be discovered through geometric proximity in high dimensional embedding spaces. In this work, we argue…
Computable Information Density (CID), the ratio of the length of a losslessly compressed data file to that of the uncompressed file, is a measure of order and correlation in both equilibrium and nonequilibrium systems. Here we show that…
This paper proposes a model of decision-making under uncertainty in which an agent is constrained in her cognitive ability to consider complex acts. We identify the complexity of an act according to the corresponding partition of state…
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the…
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers…
We investigate how asymmetric information affects equilibrium price formation in an economy with many interacting agents. Motivated by a finite-player model with two populations of asymmetrically informed agents, we study its mean-field…