Related papers: Cubic Preferences and the Character Admissibility …
When making simultaneous decisions, our preference for the outcomes on one subset can depend on the outcomes on a disjoint subset. In referendum elections, this gives rise to the separability problem, where a voter must predict the outcome…
Divided Government is nowadays a common feature of the U.S. political system. The voters can cast partisan ballots for two political powers the executive (Presidential elections) and the legislative (the Congress election). Some recent…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
Conjoint experiments randomize multidimensional profiles, offering a powerful design for recovering structural preference parameters -- including marginal rates of substitution, willingness to pay, and the distribution of preferences across…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Popular matchings provide a model of matching under preferences in which a solution corresponds to a Condorcet winner in voting systems. In a bipartite graph in which the vertices have preferences over their neighbours, a matching is…
A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has…
Modeling user interests is crucial in real-world recommender systems. In this paper, we present a new user interest representation model for personalized recommendation. Specifically, the key novelty behind our model is that it explicitly…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
Two of the main factors shaping an individual's opinion are social coordination and personal preferences, or personal biases. To understand the role of those and that of the topology of the network of interactions, we study an extension of…
Firstly, we reduce the long-standing problem of ascertaining the Hilbert-Schmidt probability that a generic pair of qubits is separable to that of determining the specific nature of a one-dimensional (separability) function of the radial…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
Aggregating agent preferences into a collective decision is an important step in many problems (e.g., hiring, elections, peer review) and across areas of computer science (e.g., reinforcement learning, recommender systems). As Social Choice…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
An election is a pair $(C,V)$ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation) of the candidates. An election is $d$-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates and voters into $\mathbb{R}^d$ such that voter $v$…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…
We survey a host of results from discrete geometry that have bearing on the analysis of geometric models of approval voting. Such models view the political spectrum as a geometric space, with geometric constraints on voter preferences.…