Related papers: Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group f…
Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas requires models that capture the complexity of real-world interactions. While network frameworks have provided valuable insights to model the evolution of cooperation, they are unable to encode…
Integrating social robots in our group-based society, beyond the technical challenges, requires considering the social group dynamics. Following the results from preliminary exploratory studies on the influence of social robots on group…
Previous studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas it still lacks specific evidence that punishment maintains cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game as well.…
Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we…
In our recent model, the cooperation emerges as a positive feedback between a not-too-bad reputation and an altruistic attitude. Here we introduce a bias of altruism as to favorize members of the same group. The matrix F(i,j) of frequency…
We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $\mu$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In…
Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-world dilemma situations,…
Using methods from evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates the difference between social cohesion and task cohesion in promoting the evolution of cooperation in group interactions. Players engage in public goods games and are…
People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group structure affects the way people cooperate, and how they…
In this work we study a modified version of the two-dimensional Sznajd sociophysics model. In particular, we consider the effects of agents' reputations in the persuasion rules. In other words, a high-reputation group with a common opinion…
Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated,…
Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured - i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any…
A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…
Reputation serves as a powerful mechanism for promoting cooperation in multi-agent systems, as agents are more inclined to cooperate with those of good social standing. While existing multi-agent reinforcement learning methods typically…
In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games (MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and…
Stabilizing cooperation among self-interested individuals presents a fundamental challenge in evolutionary theory and social science. While classical models predict the dominance of defection in social dilemmas, empirical and theoretical…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…
Getting a group to adopt cooperative norms is an enduring challenge. But in real-world settings, individuals don't just passively accept static environments, they act both within and upon the social systems that structure their…