Related papers: Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group f…
Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…
Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but…
In the traditional setup of public goods game all players are involved in every available groups and the mutual benefit is shared among competing cooperator and defector strategies. But in real life situations the group formation of players…
Melamed, Harrell, and Simpson have recently reported on an experiment which appears to show that cooperation can arise in a dynamic network without reputational knowledge, i.e., purely via dynamics [1]. We believe that their experimental…
Understanding and resolving cooperation dilemmas are key challenges in evolutionary game theory, which have revealed several mechanisms to address them. This paper investigates the comprehensive influence of multiple reputation-related…
Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…
A good group reputation often facilitates more efficient synergistic teamwork in production activities. Here we translate this simple motivation into a reputation-based synergy and discounting mechanism in the public goods game.…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…
Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the "leading-eight" strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining…
Creating incentives for cooperation is a challenge in natural and artificial systems. One potential answer is reputation, whereby agents trade the immediate cost of cooperation for the future benefits of having a good reputation. Game…
Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence.…
We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the effects that are brought about by different sizes of groups where individuals collect their payoffs and search for potential strategy donors.…
In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game…
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation…
Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we…
Cooperation in groups underpins collective responses to challenges from climate governance to public goods provision, yet how moral evaluation sustains it remains poorly understood. Indirect reciprocity -- cooperating to build a good…
Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should moral reputations be updated as we observe social behavior, and when will a population converge on…
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public…
We study a modified version of the Naming Game, a recently introduced model which describes how shared vocabulary can emerge spontaneously in a population without any central control. In particular, we introduce a new mechanism that allows…