Related papers: A consensus opinion model based on the evolutionar…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…
There are numerous examples of societies with extremely stable mix of contrasting opinions. We argue that this stability is a result of an interplay between society network topology adjustment and opinion changing processes. To support this…
With the advent of online networks, societies are substantially more connected with individual members able to easily modify and maintain their own social links. Here, we show that active network maintenance exposes agents to confirmation…
The adaptive voter model has been widely studied as a conceptual model for opinion formation processes on time-evolving social networks. Past studies on the effect of zealots, i.e. nodes aiming to spread their fixed opinion throughout the…
The issue of opinion sharing and formation has received considerable attention in the academic literature, and a few models have been proposed to study this problem. However, existing models are limited to the interactions among nearest…
The structure of a network can significantly influence the properties of the dynamical processes which take place on them. While many studies have been devoted to this influence, much less attention has been devoted to the interplay and…
Evolutionary game theory offers a general framework to study how behaviors evolve by social learning in a population. This body of theory can accommodate a range of social dilemmas, or games, as well as real-world complexities such as…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
The voter model is a simple agent-based model to mimic opinion dynamics in social networks: a randomly chosen agent adopts the opinion of a randomly chosen neighbour. This process is repeated until a consensus emerges. Although the basic…
We consider a coupled Polya's urn scheme for social dynamics on networks. Agents hold continuum-valued opinions on a two-state issue and randomly converse with their neighbors on a graph, agreeing on one of the two states. The probability…
We developed a statistical mechanics approach to the problem of opinion formation in interacting agents, constrained by a set of social rules, $B$. To provide the agents with an adaptive quality, we represented both the social agents and…
We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of…
In this paper, we study a model of opinion dynamics in a social network in the presence increasing interpersonal influence, i.e., increasing peer pressure. Each agent in the social network has a distinct social stress function given by a…
Opinion dynamics has recently been modeled from a game-theoretic perspective, where opinion updates are captured by individuals' cost functions representing their motivations. Conventional formulations aggregate multiple motivations into a…
The voter model is a classical interacting particle system, modelling how global consensus is formed by local imitation. We analyse the time to consensus for a particular family of voter models when the underlying structure is a scale-free…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
The formation of opinions in a large population is governed by endogenous (human interactions) and exogenous (media influence) factors. In the analysis of opinion evolution in a large population, decision making rules can be approximated…
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will…
In the evolutionary minority game, agents are allowed to evolve their strategies (``mutate'') based on past experience. We explore the dependence of the system's global behavior on the response time and the mutation threshold of the agents.…
In this work we study the opinion evolution in a community-based population with intergroup interactions. We address two issues. First, we consider that such intergroup interactions can be negative with some probability $p$. We develop a…