Related papers: Unfair and Anomalous Evolutionary Dynamics from Fl…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…
Due to the conventional distinction between ecological (rapid) and evolutionary (slow)timescales, ecological and population models to date have typically ignored the effects of evolution. Yet the potential for rapid evolutionary change has…
The environment undergoes perpetual changes that are influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Consequently, it exerts a substantial influence on an individual's physical and psychological state, directly or…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
Spatial structure can play an important role in the evolution of cooperative behavior and the achievement of collective success of a population. In this paper, we explore the role of random and directed motion on spatial pattern formation…
We introduce a model, based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, for studying the dynamics of group formation. The latter constitutes a relevant phenomenon observed in different animal species, whose individuals tend to cluster together forming…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
The environment in which a population evolves can have a crucial impact on selection. We study evolutionary dynamics in finite populations of fixed size in a changing environment. The population dynamics are driven by birth and death…
Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…
We propose a stochastic model in evolutionary game theory where individuals (or subpopulations) can mutate changing their strategies randomly (but rarely) and explore the external environment. This environment affects the selective pressure…
Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…