Related papers: A Unifying Framework for Manipulation Problems
Predictive modeling is increasingly being employed to assist human decision-makers. One purported advantage of replacing human judgment with computer models in high stakes settings-- such as sentencing, hiring, policing, college admissions,…
We present a new algorithmic framework for grouped variable selection that is based on discrete mathematical optimization. While there exist several appealing approaches based on convex relaxations and nonconvex heuristics, we focus on…
Challenge the champ tournaments are one of the simplest forms of competition, where a (initially selected) champ is repeatedly challenged by other players. If a player beats the champ, then that player is considered the new (current) champ.…
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…
One way of evaluating social choice (voting) rules is through a utilitarian distortion framework. In this model, we assume that agents submit full rankings over the alternatives, and these rankings are generated from underlying, but…
We prove that every Condorcet-consistent voting rule can be manipulated by a voter who completely reverses their preference ranking, assuming that there are at least 4 alternatives. This corrects an error and improves a result of [Sanver,…
This paper presents a general-purpose formulation of a large class of discrete-time planning problems, with hybrid state and control-spaces, as factored transition systems. Factoring allows state transitions to be described as the…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…
We study a variant of Set Cover where each element of the universe has some demand that determines how many times the element needs to be covered. Moreover, we examine two generalizations of this problem when a set can be included multiple…
The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule for $z$ candidates such that in each vote, the first candidate receives $z-1$ points, the second $z-2$ points and so on. The winner in the Borda rule is the candidate with highest total…
We focus on the election manipulation problem through social influence, where a manipulator exploits a social network to make her most preferred candidate win an election. Influence is due to information in favor of and/or against one or…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
Consider an undirected graph G, representing a social network, where each node is blue or red, corresponding to positive or negative opinion on a topic. In the voter model, in discrete time rounds, each node picks a neighbour uniformly at…
Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is…
In recommender systems, a common problem is the presence of various biases in the collected data, which deteriorates the generalization ability of the recommendation models and leads to inaccurate predictions. Doubly robust (DR) learning…
Based on the observation that many existing discrete choice models admit a welfare function of utilities whose gradient gives the choice probability vector, we propose a new representation of discrete choice model which we call the…
Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic study of a…
We propose the use of Agent Based Models (ABMs) inside a reinforcement learning framework in order to better understand the relationship between automated decision making tools, fairness-inspired statistical constraints, and the social…