Related papers: Cooperation risk and Nash equilibrium: quantitativ…

This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

The aim of this paper is to formulate and study a stochastic model for the management of environmental assets in a geographical context where in each place the local authorities take their policy decisions maximizing their own welfare,…

Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

In this work, we study the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for monotone generalized noncooperative games with set constraints and shared affine inequality constraints. A distributed regularized penalty method is proposed. The…

The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…

We investigate what quantum advantages can be obtained in multipartite non-cooperative games by studying how different types of quantum resources can lead to new Nash equilibria and improve social welfare -- a measure of the quality of an…

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…

The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…

Providing commons in the risky world is crucial for human survival, however, suffers more from the "free-riding" problem. Here, we proposed a solution that limits the access of the resource to an agent and tested its efficiency with a novel…

This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a game whose strategy space is continuous without access to gradients of the utility function. Such games arise, for example, when players' strategies are represented by…

In a graphical game agents play with their neighbors on a graph to achieve an appropriate state of equilibrium. Here relevant problems are characterizing the equilibrium set and discovering efficient algorithms to find such an equilibrium…

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated,…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the…