Related papers: Characterizing Assumption of Rationality by Incomp…
In an interactive belief model, are the players "commonly meta-certain" of the model itself? This paper formalizes such implicit "common meta-certainty" assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players' beliefs from events…
In this paper the theory of semi-bounded rationality is proposed as an extension of the theory of bounded rationality. In particular, it is proposed that a decision making process involves two components and these are the correlation…
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another -- if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an…
There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest…
In many expert and everyday reasoning contexts it is very useful to reason on the basis of defeasible assumptions. For instance, if the information at hand is incomplete we often use plausible assumptions, or if the information is…
Rationality has been an intriguing topic for several decades. Even the scope of definition of rationality across different subjects varies. Several theories (e.g., game theory) initially evolved on the basis that agents (e.g., humans) are…
Rational decision making in its linguistic description means making logical decisions. In essence, a rational agent optimally processes all relevant information to achieve its goal. Rationality has two elements and these are the use of…
Understanding how biological organisms make decisions is of fundamental importance in understanding behavior. Such an understanding within evolutionary game theory so far has been sought by appealing to bounded rationality. Here, we present…
An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…
An inductive logic can be formulated in which the elements are not propositions or probability distributions, but information systems. The logic is complete for information systems with binary hypotheses, i.e., it applies to all such…
We provide a novel semantics for belief using simplicial complexes. In our framework, belief satisfies the \textsf{KD45} axioms and rules as well as the ``knowledge implies belief'' axiom ($K\phi \lthen B\phi$); in addition, we adopt the…
A knowledge system S describing a part of real world does in general not contain complete information. Reasoning with incomplete information is prone to errors since any belief derived from S may be false in the present state of the world.…
We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents'…
In this paper we formulate the problem of inference under incomplete information in very general terms. This includes modelling the process responsible for the incompleteness, which we call the incompleteness process. We allow the process…
This work introduces a framework for quantifying the information content of logical propositions through the use of implication hypergraphs. We posit that a proposition's informativeness is primarily determined by its relationships with…
We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
In imperfect-information games, agents must make decisions based on partial knowledge of the game state. The Belief Stochastic Game model addresses this challenge by delegating state estimation to the game model itself. This allows agents…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…