Related papers: Secure Sensor Design Against Undetected Infiltrati…
Cyber-physical systems, such as self-driving cars or autonomous aircraft, must defend against attacks that target sensor hardware. Analyzing system design can help engineers understand how a compromised sensor could impact the system's…
In this paper a novel approach to co-design controller and attack detector for nonlinear cyber-physical systems affected by false data injection (FDI) attack is proposed. We augment the model predictive controller with an additional…
Over the past decade, industrial control systems have experienced a massive integration with information technologies. Industrial networks have undergone numerous technical transformations to protect operational and production processes,…
We propose a novel framework for modelling attack scenarios in cyber-physical control systems: we represent a cyber-physical system as a constrained switching system, where a single model embeds the dynamics of the physical process, the…
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are widely used in critical infrastructures that face various cyberattacks causing physical damage. With the increasing integration of the ICSs and information technology (IT), ensuring the security of ICSs…
This article studies a fundamental problem of security of cyber-physical systems (CPSs): that of detecting, almost surely, the presence of malicious components in the CPS. We assume that some of the actuators may be malicious while all…
Nowadays, many control systems are networked and embed communication and computation capabilities. Such control architectures are prone to cyber attacks on the cyberinfrastructure. Consequently, there is an impellent need to develop…
Malicious attacks on modern autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can leverage information about the system dynamics and noise characteristics to hide while hijacking the system toward undesired states. Given attacks attempting to hide…
Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the…
This paper quantifies the security of uncertain interconnected systems under stealthy data injection attacks. In particular, we consider a large-scale system composed of a certain subsystem interconnected with an uncertain subsystem, where…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…
Although adverse effects of attacks have been acknowledged in many cyber-physical systems, there is no system-theoretic comprehension of how a compromised agent can leverage communication capabilities to maximize the damage in distributed…
In this paper, we investigate joint sensor-actuator cyber attacks in discrete event systems. We assume that attackers can attack some sensors and actuators at the same time by altering observations and control commands. Because of the…
This paper studies the deployment of joint moving target defense (MTD) and deception against multi-stage cyberattacks. Given the system equipped with MTD that randomizes between different configurations, we investigate how to allocate a…
The coming decades may see the large scale deployment of networked cyber-physical systems to address global needs in areas such as energy, water, healthcare, and transportation. However, as recent events have shown, such systems are…
Security issues have gathered growing interest within the control systems community, as physical components and communication networks are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this context, recent literature has studied increasingly…
Stealthy sensor injection attacks are serious threats for industrial plants as they can compromise the plant's integrity without being detected by traditional fault detectors. In this manuscript, we study the possibility of revealing the…
We study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown…
Research evidence in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) shows that the introduced tight coupling of information technology with physical sensing and actuation leads to more vulnerability and security weaknesses. But, the traditional security…
This paper proposes an actuator security index based on the definition of perfect undetectability. This index can help a control system operator to localize the most vulnerable actuators in the networked control system, which can then be…