Related papers: Power Analysis Based Side Channel Attack
Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern…
Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art…
The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a…
The various benefits of multi-tenanting, such as higher device utilization and increased profit margin, intrigue the cloud field-programmable gate array (FPGA) servers to include multi-tenanting in their infrastructure. However, this…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are well-known threats to sensitive hardware like advanced encryption standard (AES) crypto cores. Given the significant impact of supply voltages (VCCs) on power profiles, various countermeasures based on…
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…
Context switching is utilized by operating systems to change the execution context between application programs. It involves saving and restoring the states of multiple registers and performing a pipeline flush to remove any pre-fetched…
To make cryptographic processors more resilient against side-channel attacks, engineers have developed various countermeasures. However, the effectiveness of these countermeasures is often uncertain, as it depends on the complex interplay…
Power side-channel (PSC) analysis is pivotal for securing cryptographic hardware. Prior art focused on securing gate-level netlists obtained as-is from chip design automation, neglecting all the complexities and potential side-effects for…
Side-channel attacks exploit variations in non-functional behaviors to expose sensitive information across security boundaries. Existing methods leverage side-channels based on power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, silicon substrate…
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often…
While modern masking schemes provide provable security against passive side-channel analysis (SCA), such as power analysis, single faults can be employed to recover the secret key of ciphers even in masked implementations. In this paper, we…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
Power Side-Channel (PSC) attacks exploit power consumption patterns to extract sensitive information, posing risks to cryptographic operations crucial for secure systems. Traditional countermeasures, such as masking, face challenges…
Power side-channel attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information of encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct power side-channel analysis for assessing the…
In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during…
Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…
To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…