Related papers: Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of coopera…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
In this paper we address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the prisoner's dilemma game as metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation capacity. We present a new strategy update rule…
Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…
Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…
We propose to reformulate the payoff matrix structure of Prisoner's Dilemma Game, by introducing threat and greed factors, and show their effect on the co-evolution of memory and cooperation. Our findings are as follows. (i) Memory protects…
In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule has attracted wide attention as an effective strategy updating rule, and voluntary participation is proposed by introducing a third strategy in Prisoner's dilemma game. Some researches show that…
Cooperation and competition are fundamental forces shaping both natural and human systems, yet their interplay remains poorly understood. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) has long served as a foundational framework in Game Theory for…
The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in…
Cooperation is a key driver of human social progress. Studies of the evolution of cooperation typically assume a deterministic outcome for social interactions. But in real-world social interactions, interaction outcomes are often subject to…
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as…
Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative actions, ranging from secreting extra-cellular products in microbial populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor and hence create an incentive to…
Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way that is beneficial for all competitors. To explore the possible…
We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of an age-structured population under weak frequency-dependent selection. It turns out that the weak selection is affected in a non-trivial way by the life-history trait. We can disentangle the…
We use replicator dynamics to study an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with memory. In this study, we investigate the characteristics of all 32 possible strategies with a single-step memory by observing the results when each strategy…
Cooperation plays a fundamental role in societal and biological domains, and the population structure profoundly shapes the dynamics of evolution. Practically, individuals behave either altruistically or egoistically in multiple groups,…
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and…