Related papers: Side-channel based intrusion detection for industr…
Modern industrial facilities generate large volumes of raw sensor data during the production process. This data is used to monitor and control the processes and can be analyzed to detect and predict process abnormalities. Typically, the…
Software debugging has been shown to utilize upwards of half of developers' time. Yet, machine programming (MP), the field concerned with the automation of software (and hardware) development, has recently made strides in both research and…
Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…
Timing side-channel attacks exploit secret-dependent execution time to fully or partially recover secrets of cryptographic implementations, posing a severe threat to software security. Constant-time programming discipline is an effective…
Cyber security risk assessments provide a pivotal starting point towards the understanding of existing risk exposure, through which suitable mitigation strategies can be formed. Where risk is viewed as a product of threat, vulnerability,…
This paper investigates an emerging cache side channel attack defense approach involving the use of hardware performance counters (HPCs). These counters monitor microarchitectural events and analyze statistical deviations to differentiate…
Industrial systems are increasingly threatened by cyberattacks with potentially disastrous consequences. To counter such attacks, industrial intrusion detection systems strive to timely uncover even the most sophisticated breaches. Due to…
Programmable Logic Controllers are an integral component for managing many different industrial processes (e.g., smart building management, power generation, water and wastewater management, and traffic control systems), and manufacturing…
Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to significant physical damage. While offline safety and security assessments can provide insight into vulnerable system components, they may not account for stealthy attacks designed to…
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the core control devices in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), which control and monitor the underlying physical plants such as power grids. PLCs were initially designed to work in a trusted…
Process Control Systems (PCSs) are the operating core of Critical Infrastructures (CIs). As such, anomaly detection has been an active research field to ensure CI normal operation. Previous approaches have leveraged network level data for…
Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…
The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…
Out-of-band screening of microcontrollers is a major gap in semiconductor supply chain security. High-assurance techniques such as X-ray and destructive reverse engineering are accurate but slow and expensive, hindering comprehensive…
Past attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) show that adversaries often target both the ICS network and the physical process to achieve potential catastrophic impact. To secure ICS, intrusion detection systems promise timely…
This study proposes an anomaly detection method for operational data of industrial control systems (ICSs). Sequence-to-sequence neural networks were applied to train and predict ICS operational data and interpret their time-series…
Side-channel analysis has been proven effective at detecting hardware Trojans in integrated circuits (ICs). However, most detection techniques rely on large external probes and antennas for data collection and require a long measurement…
Side channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information…
AES-128 encryption is theoretically secure but vulnerable in practical deployments due to timing and fault injection attacks on embedded systems. This work presents a lightweight dual-detection framework combining statistical thresholding…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…