Related papers: Ultra valuations
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and…
Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications…
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of…
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation $v$ for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \cup T) < v(S) + v(T)$) and complements (i.e., for some $S,…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (positively valued items) and chores (negatively valued items) among agents with decreasing marginal utilities over items. Our focus is on instances where all the agents have…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…
Fast algorithms for submodular maximization problems have a vast potential use in applicative settings, such as machine learning, social networks, and economics. Though fast algorithms were known for some special cases, only recently…
The classical problem of maximizing a submodular function under a matroid constraint is considered. Defining a new measure for the increments made by the greedy algorithm at each step, called the discriminant, improved approximation ratio…
A complete classification of unimodular valuations on the set of lattice polygons with values in the spaces of polynomials and formal power series, respectively, is established. The valuations are classified in terms of their behaviour with…
Metric search is concerned with the efficient evaluation of queries in metric spaces. In general,a large space of objects is arranged in such a way that, when a further object is presented as a query, those objects most similar to the query…
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…
We study the power and limits of optimal dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets; i.e., dynamic pricing that leads to optimal social welfare. Previous work by Cohen-Addad et al. [EC'16] demonstrated the existence of optimal dynamic prices…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subadditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fairness and efficiency of allocations is measured by the generalized means of the values that the…
The multiple exchange property for matroid bases is generalized for valuated matroids and M$^\natural$-concave set functions. The proof is based on the Fenchel-type duality theorem in discrete convex analysis. The present result has an…
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes" condition. The goal of this paper is to evaluate…
The matroid-based valuation conjecture of Ostrovsky and Paes Leme states that all gross substitutes valuations on $n$ items can be produced from merging and endowments of weighted ranks of matroids defined on at most $m(n)$ items. We show…
We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…
Augmented Lagrangian and optimistic primal--dual methods stabilize equality-constrained optimization through seemingly different mechanisms: the former adds constraint-dependent primal curvature, while the latter adds dual memory. Recent…