Related papers: Weighted Committee Games

This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection (union) of weighted majority games, as well as, the dimension or the codimension. We also present some examples with linear dimension and…

Voting algorithms have been widely used as consensus protocols in the realization of fault-tolerant systems. These algorithms are best suited for distributed systems of nodes with low computational power or heterogeneous networks, where…

This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions…

The remoteness from a simple game to a weighted game can be measured by the concept of the dimension or the more general Boolean dimension. It is known that both notions can be exponential in the number of voters. For complete simple games…

The traditional mathematical model for an impartial combinatorial game is defined recursively as a set of the options of the game, where the options are games themselves. We propose a model called gamegraph, together with its generalization…

Based on Holler (1982) and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021) we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in the class of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare these new power indices with their…

We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend…

We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…

Weighted voting games apply to a wide variety of multi-agent settings. They enable the formalization of power indices which quantify the coalitional power of players. We take a novel approach to the study of the power of big vs.~small…

In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…

This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning…

We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…

To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selfish player uses both the historical minority…

This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring voting power can be replaced by just…

We introduce a new family of Parrondo's games of alternating losing strategies in order to get a winning result. In our version of the games we consider an ensemble of players and use "social" rules in which the probabilities of the games…

We introduce a new framework to study the group dynamics and game-theoretic considerations when voters in a committee are allowed to trade votes. This model represents a significant step forward by considering vote-for-vote trades in a…

Weighted voting games are a well-known and useful class of succinctly representable simple games that have many real-world applications, e.g., to model collective decision-making in legislative bodies or shareholder voting. Among the…

Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…

Fairness in multiwinner elections, a growing line of research in computational social choice, primarily concerns the use of constraints to ensure fairness. Recent work proposed a model to find a diverse \emph{and} representative committee…

In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…