Related papers: Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Ga…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…

A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…

Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…

Motivated by the omnipresence of hierarchical structures in many real-world applications, this study delves into the intricate realm of bi-level games, with a specific focus on exploring local Stackelberg equilibria as a solution concept.…

This paper introduces constrained correlated equilibrium, a solution concept combining correlation and coupled constraints in finite non-cooperative games. In the general case of an arbitrary correlation device and coupled constraints in…

This paper investigates the non-zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential games with affine constraints, which depend on both the follower's response and the leader's strategy. With the help of the stochastic Riccati…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…

We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…

Due to the large size of the training data, distributed learning approaches such as federated learning have gained attention recently. However, the convergence rate of distributed learning suffers from heterogeneous worker performance. In…

In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete…

This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…

Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…

We provide a unifying framework for the design and analysis of multicalibrated predictors. By placing the multicalibration problem in the general setting of multi-objective learning -- where learning guarantees must hold simultaneously over…

We study Stackelberg games where a principal repeatedly interacts with a non-myopic long-lived agent, without knowing the agent's payoff function. Although learning in Stackelberg games is well-understood when the agent is myopic, dealing…