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A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…
In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in…
Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round $t$, a market maker posts a bid price $B_t$ and an ask price $A_t$ to an incoming trader (the taker) with a private valuation for one unit of some asset. If the trader's…
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…
Our previous results are extended to the case of the margin account, which may depend on the contract's value for the hedger and/or the counterparty. The present work generalizes also the papers by Bergman (1995), Mercurio (2013) and…
We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…
We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and single-dimensional preferences, Bulow and Roberts (1989) show…
Algorithmic trading relies on machine learning models to make trading decisions. Despite strong in-sample performance, these models often degrade when confronted with evolving real-world market regimes, which can shift dramatically due to…
Among the various aspects of algorithmic fairness studied in recent years, the tension between satisfying both \textit{sufficiency} and \textit{separation} -- e.g. the ratios of positive or negative predictive values, and false positive or…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…
We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessarily identical) distributions. There are four widely-used and…
A sequence of recent studies show that even in the simple setting of a single seller and a single buyer with additive, independent valuations over $m$ items, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is prohibitively complex. This problem has been…
The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or…
In several decision-making problems, alternatives should be ranked on the basis of paired comparisons between them. We present an axiomatic approach for the universal ranking problem with arbitrary preference intensities, incomplete and…
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…