Related papers: Cooperative Games with Bounded Dependency Degree
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
In the classical context, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value has been adapted for post hoc explanations of machine learning models. However, this approach does not easily translate to eXplainable Quantum ML (XQML).…
Quantifying the inconsistency of a database is motivated by various goals including reliability estimation for new datasets and progress indication in data cleaning. Another goal is to attribute to individual tuples a level of…
Teamwork is vital in many settings, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in some situations (``good games'') and not in others (``bad games;'' e.g., those that allow for corruption). A team's cooperation in any given game…
This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…
Cooperative Bayesian games (BGs) can model decision-making problems for teams of agents under imperfect information, but require space and computation time that is exponential in the number of agents. While agent independence has been used…
This article uses data from two experimental studies of two-person Prisoner's Dilemma games [1, 2] and compares the data with the theoretic predictions calculated with the use of a quantum game theoretical method. The experimental findings…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
The success of federated learning (FL) ultimately depends on how strategic participants behave under partial observability, yet most formulations still treat FL as a static optimization problem. We instead view FL deployments as governed…
Combinatorial games lead to several interesting, clean problems in algorithms and complexity theory, many of which remain open. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the area to encourage further research. In particular, we…
In collaborative goal-oriented settings, the participants are not only interested in achieving a successful outcome, but do also implicitly negotiate the effort they put into the interaction (by adapting to each other). In this work, we…
Networks determine our social circles and the way we cooperate with others. We know that topological features like hubs and degree assortativity affect cooperation, and we know that cooperation is favoured if the benefit of the altruistic…
The problem of finding the $k$ most critical nodes, referred to as the $top\text{-}k$ problem, is a very important one in several contexts such as information diffusion and preference aggregation in social networks, clustering of data…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…
In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of…