Related papers: Computational Results for Extensive-Form Adversari…

There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

Non-cooperative dynamic game theory provides a principled approach to modeling sequential decision-making among multiple noncommunicative agents. A key focus has been on finding Nash equilibria in two-agent zero-sum dynamic games under…

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…

This paper introduces alignment games, a new class of zero-sum games modeling strategic interventions where effectiveness depends on alignment with an underlying hidden state. Motivated by operational problems in medical diagnostics,…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…

While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting,…

We consider an autonomous navigation problem, whereby a traveler aims at traversing an environment in which an adversary tries to set an ambush. A two players zero sum game is introduced. Players' strategies are computed as random path…

Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…

Bertrand et al. [1] (LMCS 2019) describe two-player zero-sum games in which one player tries to achieve a reachability objective in $n$ games (on the same finite arena) simultaneously by broadcasting actions, and where the opponent has full…

We analyze the problem of identifying large cliques in graphs that are affected by adversarial uncertainty. More specifically, we consider a new formulation, namely the adversarial maximum clique problem, which extends the classical…

Autonomous agents should coordinate effectively without prior knowledge of others' intents. While prior work has focused on intent inference, we address the inverse problem: how agents can strategically demonstrate their intents within…

We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…

This paper studies the problem of Nash equilibrium approximation in large-scale heterogeneous mean-field games under communication and computation constraints. A deterministic mean-field game is considered in which the non-linear utility…

Many security and other real-world situations are dynamic in nature and can be modelled as strictly competitive (or zero-sum) dynamic games. In these domains, agents perform actions to affect the environment and receive observations --…

We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query…

Making decisions in the presence of a strategic opponent requires one to take into account the opponent's ability to actively mask its intended objective. To describe such strategic situations, we introduce the non-cooperative inverse…

In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…

This paper studies a simple class of zero-sum games played by two competing quantum players: each player sends a mixed quantum state to a referee, who performs a joint measurement on the two states to determine the players' payoffs. We…

We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…