Related papers: Persuasion with limited communication capacity

The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally…

The process of state preparation, its transmission and subsequent measurement can be classically simulated through the communication of some amount of classical information. Recently, we proved that the minimal communication cost is the…

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…

An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…

This paper considers the problem of covert communication with mismatched decoding, in which a sender wishes to reliably communicate with a receiver whose decoder is fixed and possibly sub-optimal, and simultaneously to ensure that the…

Information must take up space, must weigh, and its flux must be limited. Quantum limits on communication and information storage leading to these conclusions are here described. Quantum channel capacity theory is reviewed for both steady…

The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that,…

We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…

In this paper, we introduce the notion of Plausible Deniability in an information theoretic framework. We consider a scenario where an entity that eavesdrops through a broadcast channel summons one of the parties in a communication protocol…

A multiple access channel and a point-to-point channel sharing the same medium for communications are considered. We obtain an outer bound for the capacity region of this setup, and we show that this outer bound is achievable in some cases.…

We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…

In this paper the cognitive interference channel with a common message, a variation of the classical cognitive interference channel in which the cognitive message is decoded at both receivers, is studied. For this channel model new outer…

We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We analyze two conceptually distinct notions: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge, but where the model's predictions…

We study the general problem of Bayesian persuasion (optimal information design) with continuous actions and continuous state space in arbitrary dimensions. First, we show that with a finite signal space, the optimal information design is…

We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…

This work proposes a novel outer bound for the Gaussian cognitive interference channel in strong interference at the primary receiver based on the capacity of a multi-antenna broadcast channel with degraded message set. It then shows that…

This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equivalent - solving one solves the other. We use tools from the…

This work considers a binomial noise channel. The paper can be roughly divided into two parts. The first part is concerned with the properties of the capacity-achieving distribution. In particular, for the binomial channel, it is not known…