Related papers: Practical Scalability for Stackelberg Security Gam…
Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
Recent research efforts indicate that federated learning (FL) systems are vulnerable to a variety of security breaches. While numerous defense strategies have been suggested, they are mainly designed to counter specific attack patterns and…
The Stackelberg prediction game (SPG) has been extensively used to model the interactions between the learner and data provider in the training process of various machine learning algorithms. Particularly, SPGs played prominent roles in…
We present a resource-planning game for cyber-security of networked control systems (NCS). The NCS is assumed to be operating in closed-loop using a linear state-feedback $\mathcal{H}_2$ controller. A zero-sum, two-player Stackelberg game…
Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner,…
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…
Autonomous systems often operate in multi-agent settings and need to make concurrent, strategic decisions, typically in uncertain environments. Verification and control problems for these systems can be tackled with concurrent stochastic…
Stackelberg games have been widely used to model interactive decision-making problems in a variety of domains such as energy systems, transportation, cybersecurity, and human-robot interaction. However, existing algorithms for solving…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), self-interested agents attempt to establish equilibrium and achieve coordination depending on game structure. However, existing MARL approaches are mostly bound by the simultaneous actions of…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) are military conflict scenarios presented both textually and graphically on a map. These scenarios provide a challenging domain for machine learning because they are open-ended, highly structured, and…
Stackelberg prediction games (SPGs) model strategic data manipulation in adversarial learning via a leader--follower interaction between a learner and a self-interested data provider, leading to challenging bilevel optimization problems.…
In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to protect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, yet underexplored, phenomenon in security games, which we…
Mean-field games (MFG) have become significant tools for solving large-scale multi-agent reinforcement learning problems under symmetry. However, the assumption of exact symmetry limits the applicability of MFGs, as real-world scenarios…
Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…
We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in Markov games which is a cornerstone in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In particular, we focus on infinite-horizon adversarial team Markov games (ATMGs) in which agents…
Synthesizing near-optimal mixed strategies for zero-sum differential games (ZSDGs) has been a longstanding challenge. Existing research mainly focuses on characterizing the theoretical value function, while the practical design of…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…