Related papers: On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in N…
We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games of m (m >= 2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the workload of the server it chooses.…
We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient…
This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which…
We propose a model of network formation based on reinforcement learning, which can be seen as a generalization as the one proposed by Skyrms for signaling games. On a discrete graph, whose vertices represent individuals, at any time step…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
We present a new class of vertex cover and set cover games. The price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs -- in…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where we are given a graph whose vertices represent $n$ selfish agents and the weight of each edge $uv$ denotes how much agent $u$ gains (or loses) when she is placed in…
This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…
We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand…
We introduce a game where players selfishly choose a resource and endure a cost depending on the number of players choosing nearby resources. We model the influences among resources by a weighted graph, directed or not. These games are…
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…
We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
Players are arranged on a regular lattice and coded with a specific strategy for a pre-defined game. Each player sums their payoffs from playing the game with each of their neighbors, and then adopts the strategy of the most successful…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…