Related papers: Manipulation Strategies for the Rank Maximal Match…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
Abstract Like electoral systems, decision-making methods are also vulnerable to manipulation by decision-makers. The ability to effectively defend against such threats can only come from thoroughly understanding the manipulation mechanisms.…
Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is…
The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
In this paper, we study the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs in a new game-theoretical environment. In contrast to other game-theoretical settings, we consider the case in which the value of the tasks…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…
We study the maximal rank in affine subspaces of symmetric or alternating matrices, in terms of the matching numbers of certain associated graphs. Applications include simple proofs of upper bounds on the dimension of such subspaces in…
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…
Let $G$ be a bipartite graph where every node has a strict ranking of its neighbors. For every node, its preferences over neighbors extend naturally to preferences over matchings. Matching $N$ is more popular than matching $M$ if the number…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to.…
In this paper we consider graph algorithms in models of computation where the space usage (random accessible storage, in addition to the read only input) is sublinear in the number of edges $m$ and the access to input data is constrained.…
We consider the max-size popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' in G such that the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber those that prefer…
For a set A of n applicants and a set I of m items, we consider a problem of computing a matching of applicants to items, i.e., a function M mapping A to I; here we assume that each applicant $x \in A$ provides a preference list on items in…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
We study allocation problems without monetary transfers where agents have correlated types, i.e., hold private information about one another. Such peer information is relevant in various settings, including science funding, allocation of…
In the weighted bipartite matching problem, the goal is to find a maximum-weight matching in a bipartite graph with nonnegative edge weights. We consider its online version where the first vertex set is known beforehand, but vertices of the…
Let $G=(U \cup V, E)$ be a bipartite graph, where $U$ represents jobs and $V$ represents machines. We study a new variant of the bipartite matching problem in which each job in $U$ can be matched to at most one machine in $V$, and the…