Related papers: Reality-Aware Social Choice
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base…
Aggregating agent preferences into a collective decision is an important step in many problems (e.g., hiring, elections, peer review) and across areas of computer science (e.g., reinforcement learning, recommender systems). As Social Choice…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…
We consider a conception of reality that is the following: An object is 'real' if we know that if we would try to test whether this object is present, this test would give us the answer 'yes' with certainty. If we consider a conception of…
Approval voting is widely used for making multi-winner voting decisions. The canonical rule (also called Approval Voting) used in the setting aims to maximize social welfare by selecting candidates with the highest number of approvals. We…
A large amount of literature in social choice theory deals with quantifying the probability of certain election outcomes. One way of computing the probability of a specific voting situation under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying…
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should…
Sybil attacks, in which fake or duplicate identities (\emph{sybils}) infiltrate an online community, pose a serious threat to such communities, as they might tilt community-wide decisions in their favor. While the extensive research on…
Voting rules may implement the will of the society when all eligible voters vote, and only them. However, they may fail to do so when sybil (fake or duplicate) votes are present and when only some honest (non sybil) voters actively…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…
In this paper, we take a statistical decision-theoretic viewpoint on social choice, putting a focus on the decision to be made on behalf of a system of agents. In our framework, we are given a statistical ranking model, a decision space,…
The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We…
We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that…
Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of…
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We…
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency,…