Related papers: Formally Secure Compilation of Unsafe Low-Level Co…
Widely used complex code refactoring tools lack a solid reasoning about the correctness of the transformations they implement, whilst interest in proven correct refactoring is ever increasing as only formal verification can provide true…
Synchronous languages rely on formal methods to ease the development of applications in an efficient and reusable way. Formal methods have been advocated as a means of increasing the reliability of systems, especially those which are safety…
We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…
Available purely software based code attestation protocols have recently been shown to be cheatable. In this work we propose to upload compressed instruction code to make the code attestation protocol robust against a so called compresssion…
Micro-controller units (MCUs) implement the de facto interface between the physical and digital worlds. As a consequence, they appear in a variety of sensing/actuation applications, from smart personal spaces to complex industrial control…
We present a formal model of Checked C, a dialect of C that aims to enforce spatial memory safety. Our model pays particular attention to the semantics of dynamically sized, potentially null-terminated arrays. We formalize this model in…
High assurance of information-flow security (IFS) for concurrent systems is challenging. A promising way for formal verification of concurrent systems is the rely-guarantee method. However, existing compositional reasoning approaches for…
Early-stage specifications of safety-critical systems are typically expressed in natural language, making it difficult to derive formal properties suitable for verification and needed to guarantee safety. While recent Large Language Model…
In this work we present the Secure Machine, SeM for short, a CPU architecture extension for secure computing. SeM uses a small amount of in-chip additional hardware that monitors key communication channels inside the CPU chip, and only acts…
Ensuring that agents satisfy safety specifications can be crucial in safety-critical environments. While methods exist for controller synthesis with safe temporal specifications, most existing methods restrict safe temporal specifications…
Developing critical components, such as mission controllers or embedded systems, is a challenging task. Reactive synthesis is a technique to automatically produce correct controllers. Given a high-level specification written in LTL,…
Correct-by-construction synthesis is a cornerstone of the confluence of formal methods and control theory towards designing safety-critical systems. Instead of following the time-tested, albeit laborious (re)design-verify-validate loop,…
Many tools and libraries are readily available to build and operate distributed Web applications. While the setup of operational environments is comparatively easy, practice shows that their continuous secure operation is more difficult to…
Component-based design paradigm is of paramount importance due to prolific growth in the complexity of modern-day systems. Since the components are developed primarily by multi-party vendors and often assembled to realize the overall…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to assist developers with code, yet their implementations of cryptographic functionality often contain exploitable flaws. Minor design choices (e.g., static initialization vectors or…
Researchers aim to build secure compilation chains enforcing that if there is no attack a source context can mount against a source program then there is also no attack an adversarial target context can mount against the compiled program.…
We propose ProSpeCT, a generic formal processor model providing provably secure speculation for the constant-time policy. For constant-time programs under a non-speculative semantics, ProSpeCT guarantees that speculative and out-of-order…
Confidential computing protects data in use within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), but current TEEs provide little support for secure communication between components. As a result, pipelines of independently developed and deployed…
The increasing complexity of control systems necessitates control laws that guarantee safety w.r.t. complex combinations of constraints. In this letter, we propose a framework to describe compositional safety specifications with control…
Traditional security scanners fail when facing new attack patterns they haven't seen before. They rely on fixed rules and predetermined signatures, making them blind to novel threats. We present a fundamentally different approach: instead…