Related papers: Formally Secure Compilation of Unsafe Low-Level Co…
Secure compilation aims to build compilation chains that preserve security properties when translating programs from a source to a target language. Recent research led to the definition of secure compilation principles that, if met,…
Attackers can access sensitive information of programs by exploiting the side-effects of speculatively-executed instructions using Spectre attacks. To mitigate theses attacks, popular compilers deployed a wide range of countermeasures. The…
This paper discusses the relationship between two frameworks: universal composability (UC) and robust compilation (RC). In cryptography, UC is a framework for the specification and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a strong…
A compiler is fully-abstract if the compilation from source language programs to target language programs reflects and preserves behavioural equivalence. Such compilers have important security benefits, as they limit the power of an…
Weird machines---the computational models accessible by exploiting security vulnerabilities---arise from the difference between the model a programmer has in her head of how her program should run and the implementation that actually…
We present a composably secure protocol allowing $n$ parties to test an entanglement generation resource controlled by a possibly dishonest party. The test consists only in local quantum operations and authenticated classical communication…
Universal Composability (UC) is the gold standard for cryptographic security, but mechanizing proofs of UC is notoriously difficult. A recently-discovered connection between UC and Robust Compilation (RC)$\unicode{x2014}$a novel theory of…
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an important enabling technology for data privacy in modern distributed applications. Currently, proof methods for low-level MPC protocols are primarily manual and thus tedious and error-prone, and…
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach. We have…
Closed-loop verification of cyber-physical systems with neural network controllers offers strong safety guarantees under certain assumptions. It is, however, difficult to determine whether these guarantees apply at run time because…
When implementing secure software, developers must ensure certain requirements, such as the erasure of secret data after its use and execution in real time. Such requirements are not explicitly captured by the C language and could…
Proving secure compilation of partial programs typically requires back-translating an attack against the compiled program to an attack against the source program. To prove back-translation, one can syntactically translate the target…
Ensuring the safety of reinforcement learning (RL) policies in high-stakes environments requires not only formal verification but also interpretability and targeted falsification. While model checking provides formal guarantees, its…
We formalize the simulation paradigm of cryptography in terms of category theory and show that protocols secure against abstract attacks form a symmetric monoidal category, thus giving an abstract model of composable security definitions in…
The disastrous vulnerabilities in smart contracts sharply remind us of our ignorance: we do not know how to write code that is secure in composition with malicious code. Information flow control has long been proposed as a way to achieve…
An `obfuscation' for encrypted computing is quantified exactly here, leading to an argument that security against polynomial-time attacks has been achieved for user data via the deliberately `chaotic' compilation required for security…
Compiler optimizations are designed to improve run-time performance while preserving input-output behavior. Correctness in this sense does not necessarily preserve security: it is known that standard optimizations may break or weaken…
We formalize the simulation paradigm of cryptography in terms of category theory and show that protocols secure against abstract attacks form a symmetric monoidal category, thus giving an abstract model of composable security definitions in…
We map the space of soundness criteria for secure compilation based on the preservation of hyperproperties in arbitrary adversarial contexts, which we call robust hyperproperty preservation. For this, we study the preservation of several…
Formal verification of software and compilers has been used to rule out large classes of security-critical issues, but risk of unintentional information leakage has received much less consideration. It is a key requirement for formal…