Related papers: A Comparison of Stealthy Sensor Attacks on Control…

We develop and study new adversarial perturbations that enable an attacker to gain control over decisions in generic Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems including deep learning neural networks. In contrast to adversarial data modification,…

Sensor systems are extremely popular today and vulnerable to sensor data attacks. Due to possible devastating consequences, counteracting sensor data attacks is an extremely important topic, which has not seen sufficient study. This paper…

Stealth attacks pose potential risks to cyber-physical systems because they are difficult to detect. Assessing the risk of systems under stealth attacks remains an open challenge, especially in nonlinear systems. To comprehensively quantify…

This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…

Controller confidentiality under sensor attacks refers to whether the internal states of the controller can be estimated when the adversary knows the model of the plant and controller, while only having access to sensors, but not the…

Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…

Stealthy attacks on Industrial Control Systems can cause significant damage while evading detection. In this paper, instead of focusing on the detection of stealthy attacks, we aim to provide early warnings to operators, in order to avoid…

Malicious attacks on modern autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can leverage information about the system dynamics and noise characteristics to hide while hijacking the system toward undesired states. Given attacks attempting to hide…

This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be…

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…

This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…

We consider a security problem for interconnected systems governed by linear, discrete, time-invariant, stochastic dynamics, where the objective is to detect exogenous attacks by processing the measurements at different locations. We…

Safety filters ensure that only safe control actions are executed. We propose a simple and stealthy false-data injection attack for deactivating such safety filters; in particular, we focus on deactivating safety filters that are based on…

We study the problem of detecting an attack on a stochastic cyber-physical system. We aim to treat the problem in its most general form. We start by introducing the notion of asymptotically detectable attacks, as those attacks introducing…

This paper considers the state reconstruction problem for discrete-time cyber-physical systems when some of the sensors can be arbitrarily corrupted by malicious attacks where the attacked sensors belong to an unknown set. We first prove…

This paper studies the deployment of joint moving target defense (MTD) and deception against multi-stage cyberattacks. Given the system equipped with MTD that randomizes between different configurations, we investigate how to allocate a…

In this article, we address the problem of risk assessment of stealthy attacks on uncertain control systems. Considering data injection attacks that aim at maximizing impact while remaining undetected, we use the recently proposed…

A model-based windowed chi-squared procedure is proposed for identifying falsified sensor measurements. We employ the widely-used static chi-squared and the dynamic cumulative sum (CUSUM) fault/attack detection procedures as benchmarks to…

The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…

This draft addresses issues of detecting stealthy integrity cyber-attacks on automatic control systems in the unified control and detection framework. A general form of integrity cyber-attacks that cannot be detected using the…