Related papers: A Note on the Multi-Agent Contracts in Continuous …
Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…
Multi-agent systems outperform single agent in complex collaborative tasks. However, in large-scale scenarios, ensuring timely information exchange during decentralized task execution remains a challenge. This work presents an online…
In this paper we consider a family of optimal control problems for economic models whose state variables are driven by Delay Differential Equations (DDE's). We consider two main examples: an AK model with vintage capital and an advertising…
Multiagent learning settings are inherently more difficult than single-agent learning because each agent interacts with other simultaneously learning agents in a shared environment. An effective approach in multiagent reinforcement learning…
We analyze conditional optimization problems arising in discrete time Principal-Agent problems of delegated portfolio optimization with linear contracts. Applying tools from Conditional Analysis we show that some results known in the…
In the study of reactive systems, qualitative properties are usually easier to model and analyze than quantitative properties. This is especially true in systems where mutually beneficial cooperation between agents is possible, such as…
In this work, we consider the problem of autonomous racing with multiple agents where agents must interact closely and influence each other to compete. We model interactions among agents through a game-theoretical framework and propose an…
We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision…
An optimal control problem is considered for a stochastic differential equation containing a state-dependent regime switching, with a recursive cost functional. Due to the non-exponential discounting in the cost functional, the problem is…
Generalized from the concept of consensus, this paper considers a group of edge agreements, i.e. constraints defined for neighboring agents, in which each pair of neighboring agents is required to satisfy one edge agreement constraint. Edge…
In this paper, we study a time-inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem with a recursive cost functional by a multi-person hierarchical differential game approach. An equilibrium strategy of this problem is constructed and a…
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can strictly gain by recommending a complex, possibly…
We study a generic principal-agent problem in continuous time on a finite time horizon. We introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and characterise the continuation utility as a solution to a…
In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…
This paper characterizes differentiable subgame perfect equilibria in a continuous time intertemporal decision optimization problem with non-constant discounting. The equilibrium equation takes two different forms, one of which is…
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…
In this paper, we investigate the distributed optimal control problem for a kind of nonlinear multi-agent systems. In particular,both the state and the system dynamic structures of each agent are private and can only be shared among…
We study a finite horizon optimal contracting problem of a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent who receives a stochastic income stream when the agent is unable to make commitments. The problem involves an infinite number of…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
The modelling of modern power markets requires the representation of the following main features: (i) a stochastic dynamic decision process, with uncertainties related to renewable production and fuel costs, among others; and (ii) a…