Related papers: A Structural Characterization of Market Power in E…
We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the…
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
For a simple model of price-responsive demand, we consider a deregulated electricity marketplace wherein the grid (ISO, retailer-distributor) accepts bids per-unit supply from generators (simplified herein neither to consider…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
We develop a tractable equilibrium model for price formation in intraday electricity markets in the presence of intermittent renewable generation. Using stochastic control theory, we identify the optimal strategies of agents with market…
In this paper, we consider microgrids that interconnect prosumers with distributed energy resources and dynamic loads. Prosumers are connected through the microgrid to trade energy and gain profit while respecting the network constraints.…
Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…
The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market -- e.g., day-ahead and real-time markets -- is to operate efficiently. However, the price difference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseen circumstances leads…
We study deregulated power markets with strategic power suppliers. In deregulated markets, each supplier submits its supply function (i.e., the amount of electricity it is willing to produce at various prices) to the independent system…
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…
The advent of intelligent agents who produce and consume energy by themselves has led the smart grid into the era of "prosumer", offering the energy system and customers a unique opportunity to revaluate/trade their spot energy via a…
Electricity markets typically operate in two stages, day-ahead and real-time. Despite best efforts striving efficiency, evidence of price manipulation has called for system-level market power mitigation (MPM) initiatives that substitute…
Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a widely employed method for pricing electricity in the wholesale electricity market. Although it is well known that the LMP mechanism is vulnerable to market manipulation, there is little literature…
This paper considers a real-time electricity market involving an independent system operator (ISO) and a group of strategic generators. The ISO operates a market where generators bid prices at which there are willing to provide power. The…
We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…
We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities…