Related papers: On the Complexity of Robust Stable Marriage
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take $\Theta(n^2)$ steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only $\Theta(n \log n)$ steps in the average case (with $n$ women and $n$ men). In 1976, Knuth…
Let $G$ be a graph and suppose we are given, for each $v \in V(G)$, a strict ordering of the neighbors of $v$. A set of matchings ${\cal M}$ of $G$ is called internally stable if there are no matchings $M,M' \in {\cal M}$ such that an edge…
Owing to its simplicity and efficiency, the Sherman-Morrison (SM) formula has seen widespread use across various scientific and engineering applications for solving rank-one perturbed linear systems of the form $(A+uv^T)x = b$. Although the…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates: each agent ranks all others in strict order of preference. A solution to SR is then a partition of the agents into pairs so that…
Following up a recent work by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno, we study a stable matching problem with unequal numbers of men and women, and independent uniform preferences. The asymptotic formulas for the expected number of stable matchings,…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
Motivated by the application of Hall's Marriage Theorem in various LP-rounding problems, we introduce a generalization of the classical marriage problem (CMP) that we call the Fractional Marriage Problem. We show that the Fractional…
We reconsider the one-step replica-symmetry-breaking (1RSB) solutions of two random combinatorial problems: k-XORSAT and k-SAT. We present a general method for establishing the stability of these solutions with respect to further steps of…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
ML models are typically trained using large datasets of high quality. However, training datasets often contain inconsistent or incomplete data. To tackle this issue, one solution is to develop algorithms that can check whether a prediction…
We describe the notion of stability of coherent systems as a framework to deal with redundancy. We define stable coherent systems and show how this notion can help the design of reliable systems. We demonstrate that the reliability of…