Related papers: Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
In this paper we investigate the problem of learning an unknown bounded function. We be emphasize special cases where it is possible to provide very simple (in terms of computation) estimates enjoying in addition the property of being…
We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown underlying binary state of the world. Each agent, prior to making a decision, receives an independent private signal whose distribution depends…
For many online problems, it is known that the uniform arrival order enables the design of algorithms with much better performance guarantees than under worst-case. The quintessential example is the secretary problem. If the sequence of…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…
We study the learning problem of revealed preference in a stochastic setting: a learner observes the utility-maximizing actions of a set of agents whose utility follows some unknown distribution, and the learner aims to infer the…
We consider a decision maker who must choose an action in order to maximize a reward function that depends also on an unknown parameter {\Theta}. The decision maker can delay taking the action in order to experiment and gather additional…
Reinforcement learning agents tend to develop habits that are effective only under specific policies. Following an initial exploration phase where agents try out different actions, they eventually converge onto a particular policy. As this…
We study the problem of learning exploration-exploitation strategies that effectively adapt to dynamic environments, where the task may change over time. While RNN-based policies could in principle represent such strategies, in practice…
Structure learning of Bayesian networks is an important problem that arises in numerous machine learning applications. In this work, we present a novel approach for learning the structure of Bayesian networks using the solution of an…
In classical secretary problems, a sequence of $n$ elements arrive in a uniformly random order, and we want to choose a single item, or a set of size $K$. The random order model allows us to escape from the strong lower bounds for the…
We investigate a population of binary mistake sequences that result from learning with parametric models of different order. We obtain estimates of their error, algorithmic complexity and divergence from a purely random Bernoulli sequence.…
The language we use over the course of conversation changes as we establish common ground and learn what our partner finds meaningful. Here we draw upon recent advances in natural language processing to provide a finer-grained…
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…
In continual learning, a model learns incrementally over time while minimizing interference between old and new tasks. One of the most widely used approaches in continual learning is referred to as replay. Replay methods support interleaved…
A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…
We are developing a general framework for using learned Bayesian models for decision-theoretic control of search and reasoningalgorithms. We illustrate the approach on the specific task of controlling both general and domain-specific…
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…