Related papers: Nonmalleable Information Flow: Technical Report

This paper investigates a flow- and path-sensitive static information flow analysis. Compared with security type systems with fixed labels, it has been shown that flow-sensitive type systems accept more secure programs. We show that an…

The paper studies dynamic information flow security policies in an automaton-based model. Two semantic interpretations of such policies are developed, both of which generalize the notion of TA-security [van der Meyden ESORICS 2007] for…

Graded type systems, such as the one underlying the Granule programming language, allow various different properties of a program's behaviour to be tracked via annotating types with additional information, which we call grades. One example…

We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information…

Information flow security is classically formulated in terms of the absence of illegal information flows, with respect to a security setting consisting of a single flow policy that specifies what information flows should be permitted in the…

Synchronous reactive data flow is a paradigm that provides a high-level abstract programming model for embedded and cyber-physical systems, including the locally synchronous components of IoT systems. Security in such systems is severely…

Languages with gradual information-flow control combine static and dynamic techniques to prevent security leaks. Gradual languages should satisfy the gradual guarantee: programs that only differ in the precision of their type annotations…

Vulnerability of Frontier language models to misuse and jailbreaks has prompted the development of safety measures like filters and alignment training in an effort to ensure safety through robustness to adversarially crafted prompts. We…

Explainable systems expose information about why certain observed effects are happening to the agents interacting with them. We argue that this constitutes a positive flow of information that needs to be specified, verified, and balanced…

Proving only over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. Furthermore, software does not always have the luxury…

Information Flow Control (IFC) is a collection of techniques for ensuring a no-write-down no-read-up style security policy known as noninterference. Traditional methods for both static and dynamic IFC suffer from untenable numbers of false…

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…

We propose an approach on model checking information flow for imperative language with procedures. We characterize our model with pushdown system, which has a stack of unbounded length that naturally models the execution of procedural…

A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal information flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implicitly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct information flow between…

Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself,…

We introduce a framework for reasoning about the security of computer systems using modal logic. This framework is sufficiently expressive to capture a variety of known security properties, while also being intuitive and independent of…

Implicit authentication consists of a server authenticating a user based on the user's usage profile, instead of/in addition to relying on something the user explicitly knows (passwords, private keys, etc.). While implicit authentication…

Elaborate protocols in Secure Multi-party Computation enable several participants to compute a public function of their own private inputs while ensuring that no undesired information leaks about the private inputs, and without resorting to…

Static information flow control (IFC) systems provide the ability to restrict data flows within a program, enabling vulnerable functionality or confidential data to be statically isolated from unsecured data or program logic. Despite the…

This article describes the *Confluence Framework*, a novel framework for proving and disproving confluence using a divide-and-conquer modular strategy, and its implementation in CONFident. Using this approach, we are able to automatically…