Related papers: Concealing IMSI in 5G Network Using Identity Based…
3GPP Release 15, the first 5G standard, includes protection of user identity privacy against IMSI catchers. These protection mechanisms are based on public key encryption. Despite this protection, IMSI catching is still possible in LTE…
IMSI catchers have been a long standing and serious privacy problem in pre-5G mobile networks. To tackle this, 3GPP introduced the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) and other countermeasures in 5G. In this paper, we analyze the new…
Device identifiers like the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) are crucial for ensuring device integrity and meeting regulations in 4G and 5G networks. However, sharing these identifiers with Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)…
IMSI Catchers are tracking devices that break the privacy of the subscribers of mobile access networks, with disruptive effects to both the communication services and the trust and credibility of mobile network operators. Recently, we…
Although the security properties of 3G and 4G mobile networks have significantly improved by comparison with 2G (GSM), significant shortcomings remain with respect to user privacy. A number of possible modifications to 2G, 3G and 4G…
IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catchers, also known as "Stingrays" or "cell site simulators," are rogue devices that pose a significant threat to cellular network security [1]. IMSI catchers can intercept and manipulate…
The lack of authentication during the initial bootstrapping phase between cellular devices and base stations allows attackers to deploy fake base stations and send malicious messages to the devices. These attacks have been a long-existing…
Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) enable communications between vehicles, road-side infrastructures, and road-users to improve users' safety and to efficiently manage traffic. Most, if not all, of the intelligent…
In password-based authentication systems, the username fields are essentially unprotected, while the password fields are susceptible to attacks. In this article, we shift our research focus from traditional authentication paradigm to the…
We introduce LTrack, a new tracking attack on LTE that allows an attacker to stealthily extract user devices' locations and permanent identifiers (IMSI). To remain stealthy, the localization of devices in LTrack is fully passive, relying on…
The unique identities of every mobile user (phone number,IMSI) and device (IMEI) are far from secure and are increasingly vulnerable to a variety of network-level threats. The exceedingly high reliance on the weak SIM authentication layer…
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) released its first 5G security specifications in March 2018. This paper reviews the 5G security architecture, requirements and main processes and evaluates them in the context of known and new…
Lawful Interception (LI) is a legal obligation of Communication Service Providers (CSPs) to provide interception capabilities to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in order to gain insightful data from network communications for criminal…
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a new distributed method for identity management, commonly used to address the problem that users are lack of control over their identities. However, the excessive pursuit of self-sovereignty in the most…
Cellular networks are now fundamental infrastructure, powering not just smartphones for daily communication and commerce, but also enabling the expansion of IoT and edge computing through last-mile connectivity. At the core of this…
A key challenge for mobile network operators in 6G is to bring together and orchestrate a variety of new emerging players of today's mobile ecosystems in order to provide economically viable and seamless mobile connectivity in form of a…
As 5G networks become more mainstream, privacy has come to the forefront of end users. More scrutiny has been shown to previous generation cellular technologies such as 3G and 4G on how they handle sensitive metadata transmitted from an end…
Identity Management Systems (IdMs) have complemented how users are identified, authenticated, and authorised on e-services. Among the methods used for this purpose are traditional IdMs (isolated, centralised and federated) that mostly rely…
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption can protect privacy of the receiver. However, there are some situations that we need to recover the identity of the receiver, for example a dispute occurs or the privacy mechanism is abused. In this…
Over the last years, considerable attention has been given to the privacy of individuals in wireless environments. Although significantly improved over the previous generations of mobile networks, LTE still exposes vulnerabilities that…