Related papers: Evolutionary game of N competing AIMD connections

We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

Games have always been a popular test bed for artificial intelligence techniques. Game developers are always in constant search for techniques that can automatically create computer games minimizing the developer's task. In this work we…

Energy efficiency is gaining importance in wireless communication networks which have nodes with limited energy supply and signal processing capabilities. We present a numerical study of cooperative communication scenarios based on simple…

Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. In this network formation game,…

We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…

We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…

We consider evolutionary games in which the agent selected for update compares their payoff to q neighbours, rather than a single neighbour as in standard evolutionary game theory. Through studying fixed point stability and fixation times…

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…

Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…

In this paper, we study multi-agent network games subject to affine time-varying coupling constraints and a time-varying communication network. We focus on the class of games adopting proximal dynamics and study their convergence to a…

This paper develops a distributed resource allocation game to study countries' pursuit of targets such as self-survival in the networked international environment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes countries' power…

The paper presents an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to open access publishing as an asymmetric game between scientists and publishers. We show how the ordinary differential equations of the model presented can be written as a system…

This article adopts game theory to build a model for explaining the predation behavior of animals.We assume that both the prey and the preydator have two stratigies in this game,the active one and the passive one.By calculating the outcome…

In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he…

We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…