Related papers: Balanced Stable Marriage: How Close is Close Enoug…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We present a general framework how to investigate stability of solutions within a single self-consistent renormalization scheme being a parquet-type extension of the Baym-Kadanoff construction of conserving approximations. To obtain a…
We explore the consequences of incomplete information in the stable marriage problem. When information capacity of the participants is increased, more favorable games are created and the quality of the matches are also better. The simple…
Estimation of the population total of a variable can be improved by calibration on a set of auxiliary variables. It is difficult to establish that such a set of variables is sufficient, that estimation could not be improved by calibration…
As AI systems develop in complexity it is becoming increasingly hard to ensure non-discrimination on the basis of protected attributes such as gender, age, and race. Many recent methods have been developed for dealing with this issue as…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
Symmetry is a common feature of many combinatorial problems. Unfortunately eliminating all symmetry from a problem is often computationally intractable. This paper argues that recent parameterized complexity results provide insight into…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
In the past few decades there has been a good deal of papers which are concerned with optimization problems in different areas of mathematics (along 0-1 words, finite or infinite) and which yield - sometimes quite unexpectedly - balanced…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
This paper depicts algorithms for solving the decision Boolean Satisfiability Problem. An extreme problem is formulated to analyze the complexity of algorithms and the complexity for solving it. A novel and easy reformulation as a lottery…
We prove a strong inapproximability result for the Balanced Minimum Evolution Problem. Our proof also implies that the problem remains NP-hard even when restricted to metric instances. Furthermore, we give a MST-based 2-approximation…
The relationship between overparameterization, stability, and generalization remains incompletely understood in the setting of discontinuous classifiers. We address this gap by establishing a generalization bound for finite function classes…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
Assume that $n = 2k$ potential roommates each have an ordered preference of the $n-1$ others. A stable matching is a perfect matching of the $n$ roommates in which no two unmatched people prefer each other to their matched partners. In…
When solving rank-deficient or discrete ill-posed problems by regularization methods, the choice of the regularization parameter is crucial. It is also of interest, the regularization norm used in the selection of the solution. In this…