Related papers: Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Netw…

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…

A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private…

Honeypots play a crucial role in implementing various cyber deception techniques as they possess the capability to divert attackers away from valuable assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only…

In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how…

In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning attack scenarios. We prove the non-existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the attacker and defender game. We then propose a mixed extension of our game model and an algorithm to…

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…

In this work, we introduce the Deceptive Resource Allocation Game (DRAG), which studies purposeful deception within a Bayesian game framework. In DRAG, a Defender allocates resources across the true asset and several decoys to influence an…

We consider the problem of a game theorist analyzing a game that uses cryptographic protocols. Ideally, a theorist abstracts protocols as ideal, implementation-independent primitives, letting conclusions in the "ideal world" carry over to…

In this work a four terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied under two different set of assumptions: (i) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission, and…

Strategic deception is an act of manipulating the opponent's perception to gain strategic advantages. In this paper, we study synthesis of deceptive winning strategies in two-player turn-based zero-sum reachability games on graphs with…

Progressively intricate cyber infiltration mechanisms have made conventional means of defense, such as firewalls and malware detectors, incompetent. These sophisticated infiltration mechanisms can study the defender's behavior, identify…

The security in networked systems depends greatly on recognizing and identifying adversarial behaviors. Traditional detection methods focus on specific categories of attacks and have become inadequate for increasingly stealthy and deceptive…

We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…

In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…

This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…

In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some messages are received. Those games satisfy a crucial property of usual bi-matrix games: there are only a finite number of required (mixed)…