Related papers: Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with swi…
We analyze the dynamic tradeoff between generating and disclosing evidence. Agents are tempted to delay investing in a new technology in order to learn from information generated by the experiences of others. This informational free-riding…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…
In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first…
This paper considers sequential adaptive estimation of sparse signals under a constraint on the total sensing effort. The advantage of adaptivity in this context is the ability to focus more resources on regions of space where signal…
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…
When deploying autonomous agents in the real world, we need effective ways of communicating objectives to them. Traditional skill learning has revolved around reinforcement and imitation learning, each with rigid constraints on the format…
We present a physics-inspired method for inferring dynamic rankings in directed temporal networks - networks in which each directed and timestamped edge reflects the outcome and timing of a pairwise interaction. The inferred ranking of each…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
Active sensing is traditionally defined as the expenditure of energy, typically in the form of movement, for obtaining information. Here, we propose that the combination of reliance on adaptive sensors, the linkage between movement and…
Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…
We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multi-player games, and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit, and…
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
In this paper, we investigate cost-aware joint learning and optimization for multi-channel opportunistic spectrum access in a cognitive radio system. We investigate a discrete time model where the time axis is partitioned into frames. Each…
This paper presents a comprehensive analytical study of two competitive cognitive operators' spectrum leasing and pricing strategies, taking into account operators' heterogeneity in leasing costs and users' heterogeneity in transmission…