Related papers: Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with swi…

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption…

The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…

This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

Reduction of costs in biological signalling seems an evolutionary advantage, but recent experiments have shown signalling codes shifted to signals of high cost with a underutilisation of low cost signals. Here I show that errors in the…

We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…

The construction of reciprocal relationships requires cooperative interactions during the initial meetings. However, cooperative behavior with strangers is risky because the strangers may be exploiters. In this study, we show that people…

To demonstrate their commitment, for instance during wartime, members of a group will sometimes all engage in the same ruinous display. Such uniform, high-cost signals are hard to reconcile with standard models of signaling. For signals to…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…

This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…

This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and…

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…

I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…

We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…

Semantic communication (SC) goes beyond technical communication in which a given sequence of bits or symbols, often referred to as information, is be transmitted reliably over a noisy channel, regardless of its meaning. In SC, conveying the…

Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We…

Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…

In a noncooperative dynamic game, multiple agents operating in a changing environment aim to optimize their utilities over an infinite time horizon. Time-varying environments allow to model more realistic scenarios (e.g., mobile devices…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…