Related papers: Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated g…
Mixed extension has played an important role in game theory, especially in the proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic form games. Mixed extension can be regarded as continuous relaxation of a strategic form game. Recently,…
A formula is presented for designing zero-determinant(ZD) strategies of general finite games, which have $n$ players and players can have different numbers of strategies. To this end, using semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the profile…
Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's…
An oligopoly is a market in which the price of goods is controlled by a few firms. Cournot introduced the simplest game-theoretic model of oligopoly, where profit-maximizing behavior of each firm results in market failure. Furthermore, when…
Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner,…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…
Since Press and Dyson's ingenious discovery of ZD (zero-determinant) strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, several studies have confirmed the existence of ZD strategy in repeated multiplayer social dilemmas. However, few…
Using semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the profile evolutionary equation (PEE) for repeated finite games is obtained. By virtue of PEE, the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are developed for general finite games. A formula is then…
Social dilemmas exist in various fields and give rise to the so-called free-riding problem, leading to collective fiascos. The difficulty of tracking individual behaviors makes egoistic incentives in large-scale systems a challenging task.…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
This paper studies the mechanisms, implications, and potential applications of the recently discovered class of Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies in iterated 2x2 games. These strategies were reported to successfully extort pure economic…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
The Prisoner's Dilemma game has a long history stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. In 2012, Press and Dyson developed a method for analyzing the mapping of the 8-dimensional strategy profile onto the…
Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs.…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot…
Situations in which immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest conflict often require some form of influence to prevent them from leading to undesirable or unsustainable outcomes. Next to sanctioning, social influence and…
Evolutionary game theory provides a mathematical foundation for cross-disciplinary fertilization, especially for integrating ideas from artificial intelligence and game theory. Such integration offers a transparent and rigorous approach to…
Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…
This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in discounted repeated Stackerberg asymmetric games. In the leader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) deriving from the…
The self-organization in cooperative regimes in a simple mean-field version of a model based on "selfish" agents which play the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is studied. The agents have no memory and use strategies not based on direct…