Related papers: Relaxing Integrity Requirements for Attack-Resilie…
Network-based attacks on control systems may alter sensor data delivered to the controller, effectively causing degradation in control performance. As a result, having access to accurate state estimates, even in the presence of attacks on…
We consider the problem of estimating the state of a time-invariant linear Gaussian system in the presence of integrity attacks. The attacker can compromise $p$ out of $m$ sensors, the set of which is fixed over time and unknown to the…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of…
Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…
This paper addresses the problem of distributed resilient state estimation and control for linear time-invariant systems in the presence of malicious false data injection sensor attacks and bounded noise. We consider a system operator…
We consider the problem of resilient state estimation in the presence of integrity attacks. There are m sensors monitoring the state and p of them are under attack. The sensory data collected by the compromised sensors can be manipulated…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…
Motivated by the need to secure cyber-physical systems against attacks, we consider the problem of estimating the state of a noisy linear dynamical system when a subset of sensors is arbitrarily corrupted by an adversary. We propose a…
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…
In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…
This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…
Maintaining the security of control systems in the presence of integrity attacks is a significant challenge. In literature, several possible attacks against control systems have been formulated including replay, false data injection, and…
We consider the problem of estimating the state of a linear Gaussian system in the presence of integrity attacks. The attacker can compromise $p$ out of $m$ sensors, the set of which is fixed and unknown to the system operator, and…
The state estimation of continuous-time nonlinear systems in which a subset of sensor outputs can be maliciously controlled through injecting a potentially unbounded additive signal is considered in this paper. Analogous to our earlier work…
Networked systems are increasingly the target of cyberattacks that exploit vulnerabilities within digital communications, embedded hardware, and software. Arguably, the simplest class of attacks -- and often the first type before launching…
The vast majority of today's critical infrastructure is supported by numerous feedback control loops and an attack on these control loops can have disastrous consequences. This is a major concern since modern control systems are becoming…
We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…
This paper studies the problem of secure state estimation of a linear time-invariant (LTI) system with bounded noise in the presence of sparse attacks on an unknown, time-varying set of sensors. In other words, at each time, the attacker…
Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs) introduce erroneous measurement information to on-board sensors with the purpose to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker is able to leverage knowledge of…