Related papers: Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We provide a mechanism that uses two biased coins and implements any distribution on a finite set of elements, in such a way that even if the outcomes of one of the coins is determined by an adversary, the final distribution remains…
Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
Quantum game theory is a new interdisciplinary field between game theory and physical research. In this paper, we extend the classical inspection game into a quantum game version by quantizing the strategy space and importing entanglement…
We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player $n$) does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for each…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
We give a quantum algorithm for computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a $m \times n$ payoff matrix with bounded entries. Given a standard quantum oracle for accessing the payoff matrix our algorithm runs…
In an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon in expectation by unilateral deviation. An epsilon well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium has the stronger requirement that every pure strategy used with…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…
We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\epsilon, \gamma)$-differential privacy, that…
We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…
In this paper, we introduce a simplicial complex representation for finite non-cooperative games in the strategic form. The covering space of the simplicial game complex is introduced and we show that the covering complex is a powerful tool…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
This paper studies the limits of empirical means of open-loop Nash equilibria of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games as the number of players goes to infinity, when the corresponding mean field game is of potential type and may…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…