Related papers: Stability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargai…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
In this article we study the stable marriage game induced by the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. Our setting is standard: all the lists are complete and the matching mechanism is the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. It is well…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash…
We consider stationary solutions of the three dimensional Navier--Stokes equations (NS3D) with periodic boundary conditions and driven by an external force which might have a deterministic and a random part. The random part of the force is…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval…
This paper focuses on the stability of solutions for a velocity-tracking problem associated with the two-dimensional Navier-Stokes equations. The considered optimal control problem does not possess any regularizer in the cost, and hence…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
Algorithmic stability is a central concept in statistics and learning theory that measures how sensitive an algorithm's output is to small changes in the training data. Stability plays a crucial role in understanding generalization,…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…
Standard Markovian optimal stopping problems are consistent in the sense that the first entrance time into the stopping set is optimal for each initial state of the process. Clearly, the usual concept of optimality cannot in a…
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals attempt to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. We find that the stable solutions are generally not the globally best…
Consider the Euclidean traveling salesman problem with $n$ random points on the plane. Suppose that one of the points is shifted to a new random location. This gives us a new optimal path. Consider such shifts for each of the $n$ points. Do…