Related papers: Numerical Scheme for Dynkin Games under Model Unce…
We implement a high-order numerical scheme for the entropy-based moment closure, the so-called M$_N$ model, for linear kinetic equations in slab geometry. A discontinuous Galerkin (DG) scheme in space along with a strong-stability…
We formulate a Contract for Difference (CfD) with early exit options as a two-player zero-sum Dynkin game, reflecting the strategic interaction between an electricity producer and a regulatory entity. The game incorporates penalties for…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…
The sero-sum stopping game for the stochastic sequences has been formulated in late sixties of the twenty century by Dynkin (1969). The formulation had the assumption about separability of decision moment of the players which simplified the…
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we extend the results of [33] concerning the existence and uniqueness of second-order reflected 2BSDEs to the case of two obstacles. Under some regularity assumptions on one of the barriers, similar…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
We construct numerical approximations for Mean Field Games with fractional or nonlocal diffusions. The schemes are based on semi-Lagrangian approximations of the underlying control problems/games along with dual approximations of the…
Continuous-time empirical dynamic discrete choice games offer notable computational advantages over discrete-time models. This paper addresses remaining computational and econometric challenges to further improve both model solution and…
Zero-sum Dynkin games under Poisson constraints, where players can only stop at the event times of a Poisson process, have been studied widely in the recent literature. The constraint can be modelled in two ways: either both players share…
We introduce a mixed {\em generalized} Dynkin game/stochastic control with ${\cal E}^f$-expectation in a Markovian framework. We study both the case when the terminal reward function is supposed to be Borelian only and when it is…
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic system. Dynamic games model a wide variety of applications in economics, defense, and energy systems. However, compared to single-agent…
We propose a class of numerical schemes for mixed optimal stopping and control of processes with infinite activity jumps and where the objective is evaluated by a nonlinear expectation. Exploiting an approximation by switching systems,…
We adapt the Stochastic Perron's method in Bayraktar and Sirbu (ArXiv: 1103.0538) to the case of double obstacle problems associated to Dynkin games. We construct, symmetrically, a viscosity sub-solution which dominates the upper value of…
Continuous and discrete game-theoretic models of dispersed material drying process are formalized and studied in the paper. The existence of optimal drying strategies is shown through application of results from the theory of differential…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations with jumps and partial information. First, we prove a sufficient maximum…
This paper introduces a systematic methodological framework to design and analyze distributed algorithms for optimization and games over networks. Starting from a centralized method, we identify an aggregation function involving all the…